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THE UNITED STATES’ WITHDRAWAL FROM 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
JURISDICTION IN CONSULAR CASES: 
REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
JOHN QUIGLEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol 
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. The Optional Protocol provides 
for jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when any 
state party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(VCCR)1 seeks to sue another state party for violating it.2 
Controversy over VCCR Article 36, which allows a foreign 
national under arrest to contact a home state consul, prompted the 
withdrawal. The United States had just lost two cases in the ICJ 
arising out of situations in which police in the United States had failed 
to observe consular access for arrested foreign nationals. The 
withdrawal was a response to those ICJ decisions. 
The withdrawal raised questions about the intent of the United 
States to comply with its obligations under the VCCR. For a number 
of years, the United States has taken a view of the consequences of 
non-compliance with VCCR Article 36 that is at odds with the views 
of other states party to the VCCR. The United States reads VCCR 
Article 36 as affording less protection for a foreign national whose 
consular access was not respected than do other states. 
Many view the withdrawal as a significant reversal of U.S. policy 
regarding U.S. participation in international dispute resolution 
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 1.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter VCCR]. 
 2.  Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488 
[hereinafter Optional Protocol]. 
QUIGLEY_FMT2.1..DOC 1/30/2009  9:58:47 AM 
264 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:263 
mechanisms, particularly the ICJ, since the United States was an early 
and strong proponent of compulsory dispute settlement for violations 
of the VCCR.3 
The withdrawal limited the ability of the United States to sue 
other states party to the VCCR for violations of the rights of U.S. 
consuls and U.S. nationals. Lacking the Optional Protocol as a 
jurisdictional basis, the United States is not likely to establish 
jurisdiction over other states for violations of consular access rights or 
any other aspect of consular law.4 
The withdrawal also raised legal issues, the most significant of 
which deals with the validity of the withdrawal. Under international 
law, it is unclear whether states are free to withdraw from a treaty 
that does not expressly provide for withdrawal in a so-called 
“denunciation clause.”5 The Optional Protocol contains no such 
clause. 
At the policy level, the withdrawal fueled charges that the 
United States takes a unilateralist approach to international law. The 
United States has been at odds with other nations in recent years on 
issues ranging from military action to environmental protection.6 The 
withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol seemed to some as 
one more example of a go-it-alone approach by the United States. 
This Article examines the reasons for the 2005 withdrawal from 
the VCCR Optional Protocol, why the United States deemed it 
appropriate to change course from its earlier position, what the 
withdrawal means for U.S. compliance with consular access 
obligations, whether the withdrawal is legally valid, and what it may 
mean for U.S. compliance with international law and participation in 
international dispute settlement processes. 
I. THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE VCCR OPTIONAL 
PROTOCOL 
States that are party to the VCCR have the choice of adhering to 
the Optional Protocol.7 By becoming a party to the Optional 
Protocol, a state that is already a party to the VCCR gains jurisdiction 
 
 3. LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 574-76 (3d ed. 2008). 
 4.  See infra § I. 
 5.  See infra § VIII(b). 
 6.  See Paul Kevin Waterman, Note, From Kyoto to ANWR: Critiquing the Bush 
Administration's Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 749, 759 (2003). 
 7.  See Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1. 
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in the ICJ to sue any other state party for any violation of the VCCR, 
but at the same time, such a state opens itself up to being sued by 
other states party to the VCCR for any violation of the VCCR.8 The 
operative provision of the Optional Protocol reads: 
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the 
[Vienna] Convention [on Consular Relations] shall lie within the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and 
may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application 
made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present 
Protocol.9 
By adhering to the VCCR and the Optional Protocol, as it did in 
1969, the United States gained a right to sue other states for VCCR 
violations and conversely exposed itself to being sued for VCCR 
violations by other states that are party to both the VCCR and the 
Optional Protocol. 
The VCCR Optional Protocol provides the principal 
jurisdictional base whereby the United States sues and can be sued 
for consular law violations. This is so because the United States is not 
currently subject to the ICJ’s so-called compulsory jurisdiction, under 
which states that file a declaration with the ICJ may sue other states 
that have filed such a declaration and, in turn, can be sued by them.10 
Hence, the withdrawal, if valid, effectively insulated the United States 
from future consular lawsuits but also deprived it of the possibility of 
suing other states. 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice effected the withdrawal 
in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Annan circulated 
the letter to the other states party to the Optional Protocol and 
posted an item about the letter, which he called a “communication,” 
on the website he maintains for activity relating to treaties. The 
posting read: 
On 7 March 2005, the Secretary-General received from the 
Government of the United States of America, a communication 
notifying its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. The 
communication reads as follows: 
“. . . the Government of the United States of America [refers] to 
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 
done at Vienna April 24, 1963. This letter constitutes notification 
by the United States of America that it hereby withdraws from the 
 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See infra note 140. 
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aforesaid Protocol. As a consequence of this withdrawal, the 
United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol.”11 
The United States sent its communication to the U.N. Secretary-
General because that official is designated in the Optional Protocol as 
the depositary agency. That means that states adhering to the 
Optional Protocol communicate their adherence to the U.N. 
Secretary-General,12 who then notifies existing states party of new 
adherences.13 
As mentioned previously, some treaties contain a denunciation 
clause that specifies that states have the right to denounce, or 
withdraw, from the treaty at their sole discretion, typically with a 
proviso that they provide notice prior to the date of effectiveness of 
the denunciation.14 Denunciation clauses typically designate the 
depositary agency as the recipient to which a state would 
communicate its denunciation. The Optional Protocol has no 
denunciation clause and, hence, no provision about how to 
communicate a denunciation.15 The United States nonetheless chose 
the Secretary-General as the recipient of its communication. 
II. SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN THE ICJ 
ICJ suits against the United States were the precipitating factor 
in its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol.16 The United States had 
been sued in 1998, in 1999, and again in 2003 by states party to the 
VCCR who alleged violations of VCCR Article 36, which relates to a 
consul’s role in aiding nationals who are arrested.17 In each case, 
jurisdiction was based on the Optional Protocol, and each plaintiff 
state alleged that the United States had failed to fulfill its consular 
access obligation toward one or more of its nationals.18 In the 
terminology of consular law, the state in which such a person is 
arrested is called the “receiving state,” since it “receives” a consul of 
 
 11.  United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, ch. 3, § 8 
n.1 (Nov. 11, 2008), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx. 
 12.  Optional Protocol, supra note 2, arts. VI, VII. 
 13.  Id. art. IX. 
 14.  The terms “denunciation” and “withdrawal” are used interchangeably in regard to 
treaties. “Denunciation” is the term used traditionally, but more recently “withdrawal” has 
come to be used as an equivalent. 
 15.  See Optional Protocol, supra note 2. 
 16.  See infra § III. 
 17.  See infra test accompanying note 19. 
 18.  See id. 
QUIGLEY_FMT2.1..DOC 1/30/2009  9:58:47 AM 
2009] REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES 267 
another state. The national’s home state is called the “sending state,” 
since it “sends” its consul. Under VCCR Article 36, when a sending 
state national is arrested, the receiving state must allow the sending 
state national and a sending state consul to communicate with each 
other. VCCR Article 36 reads: 
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions 
relating to nationals of the sending State: 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with 
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. 
Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom 
with respect to communication with and access to consular 
officers of the sending State; 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving 
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the 
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that 
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending 
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication 
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in 
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said 
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the 
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-
paragraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of 
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to 
converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal 
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any 
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or 
detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. 
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action 
on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if 
he expressly opposes such action. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations 
of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, 
that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect 
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded 
under this Article are intended.19 
In each of the three cases filed against the United States, a state 
party to the VCCR alleged that its national (or nationals) had been 
arrested in the United States, but was (or were) not advised, as the 
last sentence of VCCR Article 36(1)(b) requires, of the right of 
 
 19.  VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36. 
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consular access.20 In all three instances, these nationals were then 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.21 These states argued 
before the ICJ that the violation, which in all but a few instances was 
not contested by the United States, necessitated some court action to 
provide a remedy. In two of the three cases, the plaintiff state argued 
that VCCR Article 36 afforded a right not only to it as a state, but as 
well to its foreign nationals as individuals, that the foreign national be 
advised of his or her right, and that this right could be asserted in a 
court of the receiving state in case of violation.22 The United States 
took the contrary position before the ICJ, maintaining that while 
VCCR Article 36 creates rights and obligations between the sending 
and receiving states, it does not create a right that adheres to the 
foreign national as an individual. In its view, when a foreign national 
is not advised about consular access, the rights of the sending state, 
not the foreign individual, are violated, hence no judicial remedy is 
required.23 
Courts in the United States, at the urging of the Department of 
State and Department of Justice, generally have interpreted VCCR 
Article 36 in line with the U.S. government’s view.24 Thus, when 
foreign nationals have sought a judicial remedy for a violation, state 
and federal courts in the United States have typically held either that 
they have no right or that, even if they have a right, they are not 
entitled to a remedy.25 Other courts have rejected such claims by 
foreign nationals on the basis that even if they have a right and are 
entitled to a remedy, prejudice must be found to have flowed from 
the violation, and because the courts did not find prejudice, the 
particular foreign national was not entitled to a remedy.26 Still other 
courts have rejected such claims on the basis of so-called “procedural 
 
 20.  See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 
1998 I.C.J. 248 (Order of Apr. 9); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of 
June 27); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Judgment of Mar. 31). 
 21.  See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention (Order of Apr. 9), 1998 I.C.J. at 249; 
LaGrand (Judgment of June 27), 2001 I.C.J. at 478-80; Avena (Judgment of Mar. 31), 2004 I.C.J. 
at 39. 
 22.  See LaGrand (Judgment of June 27), 2001 I.C.J. at 492-93; Avena (Judgment of Mar. 
31), 2004 I.C.J. at 42-43. 
 23.  See LaGrand (Judgment of June 27), 2001 I.C.J. at 493. 
 24.  See, e.g., United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F.Supp.2d 1250 (D. Utah 1999). 
 25.  See, e.g., Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 885-86. 
 26.  See, e.g., Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1253. 
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default”— that the claim was filed beyond the stage in the criminal 
process by which claims of illegality must ordinarily be filed.27 
Three states sued the United States in the ICJ after U.S. courts 
rejected the claims of their foreign nationals, and in each case before 
the ICJ, the outcome favored the plaintiff state. In the 1998 suit filed 
by Paraguay over the impending execution of a national, Angel 
Breard, who had been convicted of murder in Virginia, Paraguay 
asked for an injunctive ruling, which the ICJ issued, calling on the 
United States to stop the execution.28 Both Paraguay and Breard 
asked the U.S. Supreme Court to enforce the ICJ ruling, but it 
declined.29 Breard had not raised his consular access claim in the 
courts of Virginia, since his lawyers apparently were not aware of 
consular access. The U.S. Supreme Court said that federal courts 
would not consider Breard’s consular access claim, since it had not 
been raised in a Virginia court.30 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, stressing the U.S. need to gain consular access for U.S. 
nationals, asked the Governor of Virginia to postpone the execution, 
but she did not take the position that Virginia was legally required to 
do so.31 The Governor ignored this request, and Breard was executed. 
The ICJ continued consideration of the case, even after Breard’s 
execution, but Paraguay dismissed the case some months later, so no 
final judgment was issued.32 
The 1999 filing by Germany did result in a final judgment. 
Germany sued over a failure to advise as to consular access in a case 
involving two German nationals—brothers named LaGrand—who 
were convicted of murder in Arizona and sentenced to death.33 One of 
the two brothers had been executed by the time Germany filed, and 
the other’s execution was imminent. The ICJ again issued an 
injunctive ruling, instructing the United States to postpone the 
execution while the case was pending.34 Like Paraguay before it, 
 
 27.  See, e.g., State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St. 3d 49 (2001). 
 28.  Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 
I.C.J. 248, 249, 258 (Order of Apr. 9). 
 29.  See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
 30.  Id. at 375. 
 31.  Letter from Madeleine K. Albright to James S. Gilmore (Apr. 13, 1998), in DIGEST OF 
U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1991-1999 ch. 2 (consular and judicial assistance and 
related issues, item 16), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/org-anization/65744.pdf. 
 32.  See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 
1998 I.C.J. 426, 427 (Order of Nov. 10). 
 33.  LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475, 478-80 (Judgment of June 27). 
 34.  LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Order of Mar. 3). 
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Germany asked the U.S. Supreme Court to implement the injunctive 
ruling, but again the Supreme Court declined.35 The second brother 
was executed. Germany continued with the case before the ICJ, 
resulting in the ICJ’s first judgment in a claim relating to a violation 
of consular access. The ICJ concluded that VCCR Article 36 gives a 
right to a foreign national to be advised about consular access, and 
that when that right is violated, the receiving state must review the 
case to determine whether a remedy is required.36 Thus, the ICJ 
rejected the U.S. position both as to a right and as to a remedy. 
Germany also asked the ICJ to rule that the United States 
violated Germany’s rights by failing to comply with the injunctive 
ruling.37 The ICJ had never decided the question of whether such 
rulings are binding, and the United States argued that they were not. 
The ICJ agreed with Germany and held the United States liable on 
the additional ground of failing to comply with the injunctive ruling.38 
Hence, on two issues the ICJ found against the United States. 
In 2003 Mexico sued on behalf of a much larger number of 
nationals. It alleged that fifty-four Mexican citizens on death rows in 
nine states of the United States had not been advised about consular 
access.39 The ICJ, at Mexico’s request, issued an injunction to stop the 
executions during the pendency of the case of three individuals, for 
whom execution dates might have been set soon.40 
Mexico asked the ICJ to rule that the convictions be reviewed.41 
In its response, the United States conceded that, in all but two 
instances, advice about consular access had not been given.42 The 
United States argued, responding to Mexico’s claim, that review of 
the allegations could be handled in the executive clemency process 
and need not be done by a court, pointing out that the ICJ had not 
previously specified which forum should review potential consular 
access violations.43 The ICJ ruled, however, that a judicial forum was 
 
 35.  Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999). 
 36.  LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494 (Judgment of June 27). 
 37.  Id. at 498. 
 38.  Id. at 516. 
 39.  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
24 (Judgment of Mar. 31).  The number for which claims were being made was subsequently 
reduced to fifty-two. Id. 
 40.  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 77, 
90-92 (Order of Feb. 5). 
 41. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 55 (Judgment of Mar. 31). 
 42.  Id. at 50. 
 43.  LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.A.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27). 
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the most appropriate and that a court in the United States should 
review the cases of the named Mexican nationals.44 
Of the Mexican nationals named in the ICJ case, the first to go 
before the U.S. Supreme Court seeking implementation of the ICJ 
judgment was José Medellin, then on death row in Texas.45 In 
February 2005, shortly before a scheduled oral argument in the 
Supreme Court in Medellin’s case, President George W. Bush issued 
a memorandum to the U.S. Attorney-General relaying his position 
that the cases of the Mexican nationals named in Mexico’s suit should 
be reviewed by courts of the states in which they had been convicted. 
The President’s memorandum stated: 
the United States will discharge its international obligations under 
the decision of the International Court of Justice . . . by having state 
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general 
principles of comity in cases filed by the . . . Mexican nationals 
addressed in that decision.46 
A few weeks later, Secretary of State Rice sent her letter, referenced 
above, to the U.N. Secretary-General to withdraw from the Optional 
Protocol. 
III. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPLANATION OF THE 
WITHDRAWAL 
Secretary Rice made clear that it was the content of the ICJ’s 
decisions that led the United States to send the letter of withdrawal: 
In a statement she explained that while the United States considered 
the VCCR “extremely important,” its objection was to the 
interpretation by the ICJ: “this particular optional protocol was . . . 
being interpreted in ways that we thought were inappropriate.”47 Rice 
accurately noted that only about 30 percent of the 166 states then 
party to the VCCR were also parties to the Optional Protocol.48 
Another State Department spokesperson, Darla Jordan, focused 
on the content of the ICJ decisions. She said that they interfered with 
 
 44.   Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 66. 
 45.  Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (U.S. Dec. 
10, 2004) (No. 04-5928). 
 46.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 41-42, 
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928). The President’s reference to “its 
international obligations” was to the United States’ obligation to comply with an adverse 
decision of the ICJ, an obligation found in U.N. Charter art. 94. 
 47.  Hugh Dellios, Rice Reaches across to Mexico; Defends U.S. Quitting Part of Consular 
Pact, CHI. TRI., Mar. 11, 2005, at C4. 
 48.  Id. 
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the prerogatives of the courts of U.S. states, especially their 
imposition of death sentences: “The International Court of Justice 
has interpreted the Vienna Consular Convention in ways that we had 
not anticipated that involved state criminal prosecutions and the 
death penalty, effectively asking the court to supervise our domestic 
criminal system.”49 
Jordan further explained that the withdrawal was aimed at: 
“protecting against future International Court of Justice judgments 
that might similarly interpret the consular convention or disrupt our 
domestic criminal system in ways we did not anticipate when we 
joined the convention.”50 
At a State Department press briefing, still another spokesperson, 
J. Adam Ereli, explained more fully the reasons for the U.S. 
withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol: 
QUESTION: Adam, can you discuss a bit about the rationale 
behind the Administration’s decision to withdraw from the optional 
protocol to the Geneva [an apparent inadvertent reference to 
‘Geneva’ instead of ‘Vienna’] Conventions which give the 
International Court of Justice a measure of jurisdiction in U.S. 
capital cases? There’s already criticism that this is part of a 
continuing trend of unilateralism  
 
MR. ERELI: Right. Well, let me address that latter criticism first. I 
don’t think anybody should conclude by our decision to withdraw 
from the optional protocol that we are any less committed to the 
international system or that we are in any way walking back from 
international commitments. To the contrary, we remain a part of 
the Vienna Convention, we remain committed to fulfilling its 
provisions and we stand by it. 
 
Second of all, the International Court of Justice, pursuant to a 
dispute referred to it under the optional protocol, rendered a 
judgment in the Avena case dealing with how state courts in the 
United States handled certain capital cases where foreign nationals 
claimed consular access. The decision that the ICJ handed down is 
a decision, frankly, that we don’t agree with. 
 
Yet, in recognition of the optional protocol and our international 
commitments, the President has determined that the United States 
will comply with the judgment of the International Court of Justice 
 
 49.  Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases; Foes of Death Penalty Cite Access 
to Envoys, WASH. POST, March 10, 2005, at A1. 
 50.   Id. 
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and that we will review—our state courts will review—the cases 
that ICJ responded to. 
 
However, we would also note that when we signed up to the 
optional protocol, it was not anticipated that this—that when you 
refer a case—cases that would be referred to the ICJ and the ICJ 
would use the—and the optional protocol would be used to review 
cases of domestic criminal law. 
 
This is a development, frankly, that we had not anticipated in 
signing up to the optional protocol and that we, frankly—we—and I 
would note, you know, 70 percent of the countries that are 
signatories to the Vienna Convention also decided not to sign up to 
the optional protocol so it’s not just the United States going against 
everybody else. I mean, we are in a sense joining an existing 
majority in not participating in the optional protocol and the reason 
is because we see the optional protocol being used by people or 
going in directions that was not our intent in getting involved. 
 
I mean, so the bottom line is we believe in the international 
system, we are a committed participant in the international 
system, as reflected by our continued commitment to the 
Vienna Convention and its provisions, as well as our decision 
to comply with the judgment. But at the same time, we see 
that in this specific case, and in the use of optional protocol, 
frankly, the way it’s being interpreted, the way it’s being 
used, go against the ideas — the original ideas that we signed 
up for.  
 
QUESTION: But this protocol came in handy for the United States 
during the Iran hostage crisis. Then there's criticism that we're now 
cherry-picking the provisions that we like and don't like, that this 
might be short-sighted in the long-run. 
 
MR. ERELI: Well, again, I don't think we're cherry-picking. I 
think that this is a really unexpected and unwelcome precedent 
where people who don't like decisions of our state courts can use an 
international court as a court of appeal. And that doesn't make any 
sense at all. And so what we're talking about is, we've got a system 
of justice that works in the United States and I don't think you 
should compare it to other countries, like Iran in 1979. We have a 
system of justice that works. We have a system of justice that 
provides people with due process and review of their cases. And it's 
not appropriate that there be some international court that comes 
in and can reverse the decisions of our national courts. 
 
. . . 
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QUESTION: But why does the United States on the one hand 
decide to, you know, go along with this ruling to review these cases 
and then just days later decide to pull back? 
 
MR. ERELI: Because, precisely because, we respect the 
international system, because we respect the authorities and the 
jurisdictions of international institutions when we sign up to those 
international—when we sign up and submit ourselves to those 
jurisdictions. So it shows that, look, even though we don’t like 
something, even though we think it’s wrong, if we submitted 
ourselves to that jurisdiction freely and according to international 
obligations, then we will honor those international obligations. I 
mean, that’s why we are complying with the case. 
 
But we’re also saying in the future we’re going to find other ways to 
resolve disputes that come under the Vienna Convention other 
than submitting them to the ICJ. We’ll do something else. So we’re 
still committed to the Vienna Convention. We’re still committed to 
upholding its principles and fulfilling our obligations under that 
convention. What we are saying is when there are questions about 
that, we’ll seek to resolve them in a venue other than the ICJ. 
Given that the ICJ in this case, as well as the Lagrand case, 
established a precedent of using this mechanism to affect our 
domestic legal system.51 
 
The Department’s position, thus, was that the United States 
would comply with Avena but would no longer submit to ICJ 
jurisdiction, in part because the Department was concerned over the 
construction given to VCCR Article 36 by the ICJ. 
IV. THE CHARGE OF UNILATERALISM 
The United States had been subject to frequent criticism for 
allegedly taking advantage of its position as the remaining 
superpower and acting unilaterally rather than cooperatively in 
international affairs. The U.S. stance on consular access, even prior to 
the 2005 Optional Protocol withdrawal, had put the United States at 
odds with other states.52 Its positions on whether VCCR Article 36 
provides for an individual right and whether a consular access 
 
 51.  Regular State Department Press Briefing, Mar. 10, 2005, distributed by FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE. 
 52.  See, e.g., Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. 
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Order of April 9); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 
(Judgment of June 27); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31). 
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violation calls for a judicial remedy had not been echoed by other 
parties to the VCCR. To the contrary, other states had been vocal in 
condemning the United States for these positions.53 
Foreign governments, starting in the mid-1990s, entered 
diplomatic protests with the Department of State when their 
nationals faced execution.54 Beyond diplomatic protest, which is a 
traditional form of objection by one state against another, a number 
of states also directly approached governors who held the final say as 
to whether an execution would proceed.55 They also filed amicus 
curiae briefs in state and federal courts in support of the claims of 
foreign nationals for a remedy for a consular access violation.56 The 
filing of briefs by foreign governments is an unusual form of making a 
position known. It is not done lightly, as it implies criticism of the 
receiving state.57 These filings thus reflected the fact that the U.S. 
position, which was being followed for the most part by U.S. courts, 
was on the international radar screen as an issue on which the United 
States was out of line with other states. 
Most states that filed briefs did so in cases involving their own 
nationals, but some filed in support of nationals of other states, which 
was an even more unusual measure that further reflects the strength 
of the view of those states that the United States was out of line.58 In 
addition, foreign states even filed as groups of states, and in one U.S. 
Supreme Court case, a group of thirteen Latin-American states filed a 
brief seeking a judicial remedy for a consular access violation.59 In the 
same case, the European Union filed such a brief that was backed not 
 
 53.  See infra notes 55-57. 
 54.  Letter from José del Carmen Ariza, Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, to 
Warren Christopher, U.S. Sec’y of State (Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with author). 
 55.  Letter from José del Carmen Ariza, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, to Ann 
Richards, Governor of Texas (Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with author). 
 56.  See, e.g., Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Mexico filed a 
brief). See also Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.Supp.2d 417, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (listing a 
number of briefs filed by other states). 
 57.  On protests in support of a co-national, see generally 1 L. OPPENHEIM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 786 (8th ed.1955). 
 58.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 2000) (noting a brief by Mexico in 
support of position of Poland in regard to a national of Poland). 
 59.  Brief of Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 
(2005) (No. 04-5928). Mexico filed a separate brief in support of petitioner. Brief Amicus Curiae 
of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Jose Ernesto 
Medellin, id. 
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only by its then twenty-five member states, but also by an additional 
twenty-one other European states.60 
A.  The U.S. Position on Rights under VCCR Article 36 
No state in the international community, including the closest 
allies of the United States, strayed from the chorus of criticism or 
came to the defense of the U.S. positions. These other states, as 
reflected in their filings, said that VCCR Article 36 guarantees a right 
to an arrested foreign national, given that VCCR Article 36(1)(b) 
uses the term “rights” to refer to a foreign national’s consular access. 
They relied on the ICJ’s conclusion on this point.61 
The United States, in making its argument that no individual 
right is accorded, cited a phrase in the preamble to the VCCR that 
reads: “Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities 
is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of 
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States . . . .”62 
It used that language to assert, in advising U.S. courts on how to deal 
with a consular access violation, that “[t]he right of an individual to 
communicate with his consular officials is derivative of the sending 
state’s right to extend consular protection to its nationals,” and 
therefore the VCCR does not establish “rights of individuals.”63 
Preamble clauses may legitimately be used to clarify the meaning 
of a treaty’s provisions, yet the particular U.S. argument ran up 
against the fact that the “privileges and immunities” identified in 
various provisions of the VCCR apply to consular officers, family 
members, and employees, who enjoy them so that a consulate can 
carry out its work without excessive interference by the receiving 
state.64 Consular officers are, for example, exempted from paying 
income tax in the receiving state on the salaries they receive from the 
 
 60.  Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International 
Community in Support of Petitioner, id. 
 61.  Brief of Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioner, id.; Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
Government of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, id.; 
Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community in 
Support of Petitioner, id.; see to same effect LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.A.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 
494 (June 27). 
 62. VCCR, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 63. Letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to James K. 
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, attachment a, at A-3: Department of State Answers to 
the Questions Posed by the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm. 
 64.  See VCCR, supra note 1, pmbl. 
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sending state.65 Additionally, they have certain privileges if a criminal 
case is filed against them,66 and their confidential correspondence 
cannot be read by the receiving state.67 
Contrary to the assertions of the Department of State in the mid-
1990s, this range of applicability of the preamble phrase had been 
recognized by the Department of State delegation that represented 
the United States at the 1963 conference at which the VCCR was 
drafted. The delegation informed the U.S. Senate during the Senate 
process leading to ratification of the VCCR that this preamble phrase 
referred to “officers, members of families, and employees” of 
consular posts.68 
Moreover, at the 1963 drafting conference it was clear that this 
preamble phrase did not apply to sending state nationals who might 
require consular services. The phrase was included in preamble 
language proposed by six delegations at the conference.69 The 
delegate of Ghana, one of the proponents, explained: “A really 
appropriate preamble to the convention on consular relations must 
include a reference to the basis on which consular officials enjoyed 
certain privileges and immunities.”70 
The drafters’ concern was that privileges and immunities for 
consuls was a delicate subject in some third-world states, since in the 
age of colonialism many European states arranged extensive 
exemptions from local jurisdiction for their consuls.71 In those states’ 
view, and in that of the states who acknowledged the concern, the 
point of the preamble phrase was to make clear that the privileges 
 
 65.  Id. art. 49. 
 66.  Id. arts. 41-42. 
 67.  Id. art. 35. See also LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 341-511. 
 68. Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Consular 
Relations, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963, in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
with Optional Protocol, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Executive E (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington 1969) 41, 46. 
 69.   U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963, 
Argentina, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia and United Arab Republic: proposed preamble to the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.1/L.71 (Mar. 8, 1963). 
 70.   Id., First Comm., 29th mtg., Mar. 26, 1963, Consideration of the draft articles on 
consular relations adopted by the International Law Commission at its Thirteenth Session 
(A/CONF. 25/6), ¶ 10. 
 71.  See Id. ¶ 3. Tunisia, which initially opposed inclusion of this preamble phrase, regarded 
privileges and immunities for consuls as “a necessary evil and differentiation between various 
classes of persons” that “should certainly be eliminated in an ideal world.” Id. at 246. Tunisia, 
however, went along with the proposal, which was adopted unanimously without vote. Id. at 
249. On privileges of consuls in the colonial period, see LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 3-25. 
QUIGLEY_FMT2.1..DOC 1/30/2009  9:58:47 AM 
278 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:263 
and immunities afforded by the VCCR were necessary to ensure that 
a consulate could carry out its functions.72 Thus, Switzerland, speaking 
in favor of the six-delegation proposal, said that “the convention 
would serve as a practical guide to . . . consuls throughout the world, 
and it would be useful to remind them . . . that the purpose of their 
privileges and immunities was not to benefit individuals, but to ensure 
the efficient performance of their functions.”73 Germany supported 
the proposal “since consuls, like diplomatic agents, were state 
officials, and both enjoyed privileges and immunities.”74 Italy, also 
supporting the proposal, characterized the phrase as “confirming the 
functional necessity of granting privileges and immunities.”75 
Hungary, analogizing to a comparable preamble clause in an earlier 
convention on diplomatic relations, supported the proposal because 
“persons enjoying privileges and immunities must not use them for 
their own advantage.”76 At the drafting conference, no state suggested 
that the preamble phrase might negate any right that the VCCR 
might give to a sending state national. 
Nonetheless, when Mexico requested an advisory opinion from 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the question of 
consular access violations in capital cases, the Department of State 
argued that the VCCR preamble language about the purpose of 
privileges and immunities negated any rights for a foreign national 
detainee. The Inter-American Court rejected the argument, just as 
the delegates at the 1963 conference had done. The Court said that 
the preamble phrase referred to consular officers. It said that it had 
examined the drafting history of the phrase, which would be the 
statements of delegates just cited, and that they reflect the fact that it 
is consular officers, not sending-state nationals, who enjoy “privileges 
and immunities” under the VCCR.77 
The Inter-American Court also pointed out that the United 
States had argued just the opposite as to individual rights when it was 
in its interest to do so—in the United States’ ICJ case against Iran for 
 
 72.  See infra notes 73-76. 
 73. Consideration of the draft articles on consular relations adopted by the International 
Law Commission at its thirteenth session (A/CONF.25/6), supra note 70, ¶ 8. 
 74.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 75.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 76.  Id. ¶ 25. 
 77.  The Right to Information in Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees 
of the Due Process of Law, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 74 (Oct. 1, 1999). 
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the hostage-taking at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts.78 In that 
case, filed in 1979, the United States sued Iran for violation of the 
VCCR on the grounds that consuls were prevented from fulfilling 
their functions and that U.S. nationals in Iran were deprived of 
consular services.79 In a brief submitted to the ICJ, the United States 
wrote that the VCCR gives rights to those in need of consular aid, 
namely foreign nationals present in a receiving state.80 The Inter-
American Court averred that this earlier position was in contradiction 
to the one the United States was then urging it to adopt.81 
The fact that the United States resorted to its argument about 
the meaning of the preamble phrase fueled the unilateralism charge, 
because it left the impression that the United States was not making 
genuine contentions but instead was seeking a pretext for violating 
VCCR Article 36. 
B.  The U.S. Position on Remedies for a Violation of Consular Access 
Nor did other states find plausibility in the U.S. position on 
remedies for a consular access violation. In international law, 
whenever a state violates a right, a remedy is required.82 Ubi ius, ibi 
remedium (“Where there is a right, there is a remedy”) is a principle 
at the core of the rule of law, both in domestic law and in 
international law. How this principle might play out in a particular 
case might vary, but the United States took a position against any 
kind of remedy when consular access is violated, other than, perhaps, 
an apology to the government of the sending state.83 In the briefs filed 
 
 78.   Id. at 47, ¶ 75 (citing Memorial of the Government of the United States of America, 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 174 
(Jan. 12, 1980)). 
 79.  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 7, 
24-25 (May 24). 
 80.   Memorial of the Government of the United States of America, supra note 78. 
 81.  The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees 
of Due Process of Law, supra note 77, at 47, ¶ 75 (“[I]n the Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the United States linked Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations with the rights of the nationals of the sending State.”). 
 82.  Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, pt. 
2, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (“The responsible State is under an obligation 
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”). 
 83.  See U.S. Department of State to Embassy of Mexico, Sept. 23, 1997, in DIGEST OF U.S. 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1991-1999 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/65746.pdf (apologizing for the failure of officials to notify Mario 
Murphy, a Mexican national, of his right to consular notification); see also Embassy of the 
United States of America, Statement of the United States of America Concerning the Failure of 
Consular Notification in the Case of Angel Breard (Nov. 3, 1998), available at http://www 
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by the Latin American states, and by the European Union in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, one finds refutation of the U.S. position both as to 
individual rights and as to remedies.84 
Although the argument pressed most strongly by the United 
States at the international level to refute any remedy for a consular 
access violation was, as indicated, that VCCR Article 36 provided no 
right to the individual, the U.S. Supreme Court focused instead on the 
remedy aspect. When asked to provide a remedy for a consular access 
violation, it said that it would assume for the moment that VCCR 
Article 36 provides a right to consular notification, because, in its 
view, even if that is so, there is no basis for a judicial remedy.85 The 
Department of State, to be sure, also denied that there was a basis for 
a judicial remedy, but its main line of argument was that this position 
flowed from a lack of an individual right. 
In the LaGrand Case in the ICJ, for example, the Department of 
State argued that an apology to the sending state suffices as a remedy, 
but that nothing need be done to change the conviction or sentence of 
the sending state national.86 The ICJ ruled against that position. 
Referring to the proposition in international law that a wrongful act 
calls for a remedy, it said that rights of the individual were involved 
and that “review and reconsideration” must be given to the 
conviction and sentence in light of the consular access violation.87 
When Mexico then sued in the ICJ, the United States, having lost 
on the rights issue and on the issue of whether a remedy is required, 
argued that the remedy need not be judicial; instead, it contended 
that a receiving state might handle consular access claims by its 
procedures for executive clemency.88 The ICJ rejected that argument, 
saying that if a court were presented with a claim of a consular access 
violation, it must entertain the claim.89 
 
.state.gov/documents/organization/65829.pdf (conveying “apologies to the Government and 
people of Paraguay” for the failure of consular notification for Breard, who had been executed 
April 14, 1998). 
 84.  Brief of Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioner, Medeillin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 
(2005) (No. 04-5928); Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the 
Interntational Community in Support of Petitioner, id. 
 85.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342-50 (2006). 
 86. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513 (June 27). 
 87. See id. at 513-14. 
 88. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
65-66 (Mar. 31). 
 89.  Id. at 65-66 (Mar. 31). 
QUIGLEY_FMT2.1..DOC 1/30/2009  9:58:47 AM 
2009] REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES 281 
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,90 the U.S. Supreme Court, not 
considering itself to be constrained by the rulings of the ICJ, adopted 
the view of the Department of State that no judicial remedy is 
required. It said that, for a particular remedy to be required, it 
needed to be specified in the text of the treaty itself, and since neither 
VCCR Article 36 nor any other provision of the VCCR specified 
suppression of an incriminating statement—the remedy sought by 
Sanchez-Llamas—it need not consider whether it was an appropriate 
remedy.91 In the Supreme Court’s analysis, the absence of any 
provision about remedies in the VCCR threw the matter to domestic 
law, as to what remedy, if any, was to be given.92 
The position that the Supreme Court adopted on remedies in 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon was in direct conflict with the position in 
international law that a remedy is required where a wrong is 
committed.93 In treaties, one finds typically a set of obligations but 
does not find a list of remedies in case those obligations are violated. 
Nonetheless, remedies are required in international law for violation 
of a treaty provision. A separate body of international law on 
remedies deals with that matter, much in the way the law of remedies 
emerged in the domestic law in England with regard to breach of 
contract. The relevant body of rules in international law is called the 
law of state responsibility,94 which provides rules on remedy that, in 
brief, call for restoration of the prior-existing situation if that is 
physically possible.95 Failing the possibility of such restoration, the 
rules call for money damages.96 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF VCCR ARTICLE 36 BY OTHER 
STATES 
The positions that the United States took concerning rights and 
remedies under VCCR Article 36 left it quite isolated among the 
states of the world in arguing that VCCR Article 36 gives no right to 
the individual and that no judicial remedy is required. Since 
implementation of a treaty by other states is one technique of 
 
 90.  Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353. 
 91.  Id. at 346-47. 
 92.  Id. at 343. 
 93.  John Quigley, Must Treaty Violations Be Remedied?: A Critique of Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 365-66 (2008). 
 94.  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 38 (Sept. 25). 
 95.  G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, pt.2, ch. II, art. 35, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001). 
 96.  Id. art. 36. 
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determining a treaty’s meaning, the Department of State sought to 
demonstrate that other states fail to provide judicial remedies for a 
consular access violation to bolster its position. The Department of 
State has presented analyses to U.S. courts and has convinced a 
number of courts that because other states party to the VCCR do not 
provide remedies, the VCCR does not require U.S. courts to do so 
either.97 
The Department of State’s analyses of court practices abroad, 
however, have been inaccurate and incomplete. In a U.S. Court of 
Appeals case in which a foreign national sought to suppress a 
confession for failure to advise about consular access, the Department 
advised the court that the foreign courts do not suppress. 
“Conversely,” the Department stated, 
we are aware of two jurisdictions, Italy and Australia, in which 
courts have rejected requests by individuals for a remedy in the 
context of a criminal proceeding of a violation of Article 36 of the 
VCCR. These are the Yater case, decided in Italy in 1973, and the 
Abbrederis case, decided in Australia in 1981. Copies of reports of 
both decisions have been provided to the Department of Justice.98 
Neither the Australian case nor the Italian case, however, 
involved a refusal to provide a remedy for a failure to advise about 
consular access. In R. v. Abbrederis, the foreign national sought to 
suppress a statement made during questioning upon his arrival from 
abroad at the Sydney International Airport because he was not 
advised about consular access. After customs personnel found a 
substance they thought to be heroin, the man made self-incriminating 
statements.99 He sought suppression for failure to advise about 
consular access. Declining to do so, the Court of Criminal Appeal of 
New South Wales said: 
The objection [by the defendant to the admission of his statement] 
in my view has no merit. Even giving the fullest weight to the 
prescriptions in [VCCR] art. 36 I do not see how it can be 
contended that they in any way affect the carrying out of an 
investigation by interrogation of a foreign person coming to this 
country. The article is dealing with freedom of communication 
between consuls and their nationals. It says nothing touching upon 
 
 97. E.g. De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 188, 189 n.5 (2008). 
 98.  Letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to James K. 
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 63, at A-9. 
 99.  R. v. Abbrederis (1981) 36 A.L.R. 109 (Austl.), 51 F.L.R 99, 100-01. 
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the ordinary process of an investigation by way of interrogation. In 
my view this ground of appeal is not made good.100 
The Court of Criminal Appeal thus reasoned that questioning of 
a person “coming into this country” is not a detention that entails an 
obligation to advise about consular access. Since the court considered 
that there was, in the circumstances, no obligation to advise, the case 
says nothing about remedies for a failure to advise.101 
Also, in Yater, a British national convicted of crime in Italy 
invoked VCCR Article 36 along with an article on consular access 
found in a bilateral Italy-UK consular treaty.102 Italian authorities did 
not notify a British consul about the arrest, but it is not clear from the 
case report that Yater’s attorney ever asserted that Italian authorities 
did not inform Yater about consular access. Although the Court of 
Cassation asked whether there was a violation of either the bilateral 
treaty or of Article 36 because of the failure to notify a British consul, 
it did not indicate whether Yater was informed of the right of 
consular access, or, if he was, whether he requested consular access.103 
The Court of Cassation, moreover, did not refer to the fact that 
VCCR Article 36 requires advice about consular access to be given to 
a detained foreign national. The case is thus of little relevance on the 
consequences of a failure to inform a foreign national about consular 
access.104 
In Australia, moreover, cases have been decided by appellate 
courts suppressing statements or material evidence gained following 
an arrest where the foreign national was not  advised about consular 
access.105 These cases are inconsistent with the proposition the State 
Department derives from R. v. Abbrederis.106 One case involved a 
 
 100.  Id. at 115. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  Cassazione Penal, sez.un., 19 feb. 1973, Guir. It. 1973, II, 464 (translated into English in 
77 I.L.R. 541). 
 103.  Id. at 542.  
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See infra notes 106, 113. 
 106.  The Supreme Court, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, sought to discount these cases as 
having been decided on the basis of the Australian statutory provision that incorporates VCCR 
Article 36 into domestic Australian law, rather than on VCCR Article 36 itself. Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 344 n.3 (2006). The Court’s theory is that Australia went beyond 
VCCR Article 36 with its statutory provision. The Australian statute did require that advice 
about consular access be given prior to interrogation, whereas VCCR Article 36 makes no 
mention of interrogation. But the critical aspect is that the Australian statute mentions nothing 
about remedy, and the Australian court thought it necessary to devise a remedy, given that 
there had been a violation of the right to consular access. 
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Singapore national convicted of importing heroin into Australia.107 
Upon arrest, the authorities did not inform him about consular access, 
but he himself asked to communicate with a Singapore consul.108 The 
authorities did not comply109 but instead interrogated him and elicited 
a statement that the prosecution sought to introduce at trial.110 The 
Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal said that an Australian 
statutory provision implementing Article 36111 was silent as to 
remedy,112 but concluded that “the proper exercise of the discretion” 
required exclusion of the statement.113 
In another Australian case, authorities seized narcotics from the 
travel bag of a foreign national detained on suspicion of smuggling 
drugs into Australia. The authorities did not inform him about 
consular access.114 The prosecution sought to introduce the narcotics 
into evidence on the smuggling charge. The Western Australia 
Supreme Court said that the detention was unlawful for the failure to 
inform about consular access and suppressed the narcotics evidence.115 
Nor has the Department mentioned a 2006 decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Germany, which calls for consideration of a 
remedy when consular access is violated. That court viewed consular 
access as a right that adheres to the individual foreign national.116 
Due to a number of factors, there are few reported court cases 
worldwide in which consular access violations have been raised in the 
 
 107. Tan Seng Kiah v. R., (2001) 160 F.L.R 26, 27-28 (Austl.). The Northern Territory is a 
federal territory rather than a state. Its highest court occupies a place comparable to that of a 
state. 
 108. See id. at 36. 
 109. Id. at 36. 
 110. Id. at 41. 
 111. Crimes Act, 1914, 23P (Austl.) (incorporating VCCR Article 36). 
 112. Tan Seng Kiah v. R., 160 F.L.R. at 37. 
 113. Id. at 42. 
 114. R. v. Kok Cheng Tan, (2001) W.A.S.C. No. 275 (Oct. 5).  Breyer characterized this case 
as an "Australian case considering but declining to suppress evidence based on violation of 
same statute." Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 394 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
However, the evidence in question was the narcotics found in the travel bag, and the court did 
suppress it. 
 115.  Kok Cheng Tan, 2001 W.A.S.C.  No. 275, ¶ 59. 
 116.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006, 2 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 2115/01 (F.R.G) (Case of F. & T.).  
See generally Jana Gogolin, Avena and Sanchez-Llamas Come to Germany - The German 
Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 8 
GERMAN L. J. 261 (2007) (contrasting Case of F. & T. to Sanchez-Llamas). 
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courts.117 For example, in civil law systems, preliminary investigation 
of a crime is done by an examining magistrate, a law-trained official, 
who may resolve consular access claims without having a case 
proceed to court.118 
VI.   CHANGE IN U.S. INTERESTS IN RELATION TO 
CONSULAR ACCESS 
The reporter who questioned Department of State spokesperson 
J. Adam Ereli astutely suggested that capital punishment was relevant 
to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the VCCR Optional Protocol.119 
The U.S. Department of Justice understands the importance of 
compliance with the Protocol in capital cases, as reflected in the 
requirements it has set for U.S. attorneys who want permission to 
seek capital punishment of a foreign national for violations of federal 
criminal law: if a foreign national is being prosecuted, a U.S. attorney 
must explain whether consular access obligations were respected.120 
Clearly, the Attorney General is aware that non-observance of 
consular access obligations may complicate the prosecution of a 
capital case. 
This aspect of the issue further fueled the unilateralism assertion, 
since, by the mid-1990s, the United States was one of a minority of 
states that still actively employed capital punishment.121 The states 
criticizing the United States for consular access violations were states 
that did not use capital punishment and that were concerned that 
their nationals could be executed in the United States.122 While they 
found the U.S. position on the consequences of a consular access 
violation to be invalid regardless of the punishment, their objections 
were the most insistent in capital cases. Mexico, as indicated, framed 
 
 117.  A Canadian trial court declined to suppress an incriminating statement made by a U.S. 
national following his arrest for murder but did so on the rationale that, in the situation, he was 
not prejudiced, rather than on a rationale that a remedy is never required. R. v. Partak, [2001] 
160 C.C.C. (3d) 553, 570 (Can.). 
 118.  Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 395-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 119.  See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 120.  Submissions from the United States Attorney, 9 USAM 10.080(A)(10) (2007). 
 121.  WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed. 1997) (noting the virtual abolition of capital punishment in 
Latin America and Europe). 
 122.  See, e.g., Letter from EU Presidency (Ireland) to Susan B. Loving, Chairwoman, 
Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board (Apr. 30, 2004) (on file with author) (urging relief for a 
Mexican national facing execution in Oklahoma, noting the EU view that capital punishment is 
cruel and inhuman, and protesting non-compliance in that case with consular notification 
requirements). 
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its question for an advisory opinion in the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights as one of consular access violations in capital cases.123 
The reporter’s question to Mr. Ereli about Iran highlighted the 
change in position on the part of the United States124 regarding 
compulsory dispute settlement for consular issues. In the Iran hostage 
situation in 1979, the United States had used the VCCR as one legal 
basis for its allegation that Iran acted unlawfully by holding U.S. 
officials hostage. At the 1963 drafting conference for the VCCR, 
moreover, the United States had been a prime sponsor of compulsory 
dispute settlement. At a time when the draft was silent on dispute 
settlement, the United States introduced a proposal reading: “Any 
dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this 
convention shall be submitted at the request of either of the parties to 
the International Court of Justice unless an alternative method of 
settlement is agreed upon.”125 The U.S. delegate explained 
that the codification of international law and the formulation of 
measures to ensure compliance with its provisions should go hand 
in hand. The response of other delegations to the United States 
proposal would make it possible to evaluate their support for 
international law and its enforcement by the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations.126 
The U.S. delegate characterized the proposal as dealing “with one of 
the most important points connected with the convention on consular 
relations.”127 Thus the United States viewed compulsory dispute 
settlement as critical to the effectiveness of the proposed consular 
convention, and the U.S. delegate, in effect, issued a challenge to the 
other states to support compulsory dispute settlement as a 
demonstration of their commitment to international law. 
In 1963, at the time of the drafting conference, the primary U.S. 
concern in consular matters was that U.S. nationals had on occasion 
been arrested and detained in the U.S.S.R. without notification of 
U.S. consuls.128 Because it was important for its national interests, the 
United States sought compulsory dispute settlement as a way of 
 
 123.  See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 124.  See supra § III. 
 125.  2 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 
1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.1/L.70, (Mar. 8, 
1963). 
 126.  1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 
1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 249, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/6, (Mar. 26, 1963). 
 127.  Id. 
 128. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 142. 
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protecting U.S. nationals. At the drafting conference, Soviet-bloc 
states argued unsuccessfully against a judicial remedy in the event of 
a consular access violation.129 
A number of states at the conference objected to the U.S. 
proposal for a compulsory dispute settlement clause in the VCCR but 
were willing to back a separate document to accompany the VCCR to 
deal with the issue.130 That approach resulted in adoption of the 
Optional Protocol, which the U.S. ratified.131 By the 1990s, however, 
the U.S. interests were different, since by then it was other states 
making claims of consular access violations against the United States. 
VII.  A NON-UNILATERALIST EXPLANATION OF THE 
WITHDRAWAL 
While there is much support for the position that the U.S. 
withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol was a measure 
undertaken to allow the United States to maintain its idiosyncratic 
construction of VCCR Article 36, two scholars have suggested a 
different assessment. Reisman and Arsanjani offer the view that, as of 
2005, the United States was complying with its obligations under 
VCCR Article 36, but withdrawing from the Optional Protocol would 
protect the United States from suits motivated by concern over 
capital punishment filed by states for which the consular access issue 
was secondary. As to U.S. compliance, they write: 
The United States had indicated (and the evidence seems to 
substantiate the good faith of its effort) that it would henceforth try 
to ensure that the rights available to foreign nationals under Article 
36 of the VCCR would be made as operational as the federal 
government of the United States was capable of making them. This 
satisfied the obligation under the Convention.132 
In contrast to an earlier case that Reisman and Arsanjani cite 
involving Peru, in which withdrawal from a jurisdictional commitment 
appeared aimed at allowing Peru to violate various obligations, they 
 
 129.  See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 
22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 85, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16, (Apr. 20, 
1963)  (statement of Mr. Avilov, U.S.S.R.). 
 130.  LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 577. 
 131. Optional Protocol, supra note 2. 
 132.  W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, No Exit? A Preliminary Examination 
of the Legal Consequences of United States’ Notification of Withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 897, 925 (Marcelo G. 
Kohen ed., 2007). 
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argue that the withdrawal would not negatively impact U.S. 
compliance. As an indication of the U.S. commitment to compliance, 
Reisman and Arsanjani quote a paragraph from the ICJ decision in 
LaGrand, in which the ICJ responded to Germany’s request for 
assurances of non-repetition of U.S. violations of the obligation to 
inform foreign nationals about consular access. There the ICJ stated 
that the United States had provided the court with information on its 
efforts to gain compliance by local law enforcement agencies.133 
That paragraph in the LaGrand judgment related to efforts by 
the United States to secure compliance with the obligation to inform 
foreign nationals about consular access but did not relate to the 
consequences of non-compliance. The United States did not suggest 
to the ICJ that in future it would regard a foreign national as enjoying 
a justiciable right, or that any remedy would be given by courts or any 
other agency of government. Hence, the United States was not stating 
that it would apply the VCCR in the manner the ICJ regarded as 
correct.134 To the contrary, the United States has followed its own 
construction of what is required in the event of a breach of the 
obligation to inform a foreign national. 
Reisman and Arsanjani suggest that, given the U.S. 
representations to the ICJ about its commitment to compliance, 
the essential objective of VCCR Article 36 was fulfilled; exercises 
of jurisdiction could not likely achieve much more and, if initiated, 
would probably be covert efforts at securing abolition of the death 
penalty. It appears likely that the United States felt that states and, 
increasingly, non-governmental organizations committed to 
abolitionism, would be able to continue to bring cases allegedly 
arising under Article 36 of the VCCR to an international tribunal 
that could well prove to be increasingly abolitionist in its 
orientation. Given the federal structure of the American system, 
the proliferation of these cases could have presented serious, if not 
insoluble domestic legal and political problems for any US 
government. Hence the decision to preempt the problem by 
denouncing the Optional Protocol.135 
To be sure, additional ICJ decisions on consular access in capital 
cases would present problems for the federal government vis-a-vis the 
states. Yet the federal government’s refusal to comply with VCCR 
Article 36 may just as well be motivated by a desire to avoid forcing 
the states to forego executions. That motivation, however, is no 
 
 133.  LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 511-13 (June 27). 
 134.  See id. 
 135. Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 132, at 925. 
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excuse for failing to comply with a treaty obligation. Even if Reisman 
and Arsanjani are correct in their assessment that the ICJ is 
abolitionist in orientation, the ICJ would have no jurisdiction to deal 
with capital punishment as such. While it might be swayed in 
decisions on consular access violations by the enormity of the 
punishment, the ICJ was careful in Avena to say that its jurisdiction 
was limited to the VCCR, which led it to decline Mexico’s invitation 
to analyze a consular access violation as a human rights issue.136 
Reisman and Arsanjani’s statement that the “essential objective 
of VCCR Article 36 was fulfilled”137 overlooked the fact that the 
United States has been adamant in its refusal to comply with the 
VCCR in the manner in which the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, and most other states of the world consider it should 
be applied. The “essential objective” has hardly been fulfilled. Quite 
the reverse, the United States remains an outlier on the issue of the 
consequences of a consular access violation. 
VIII. VALIDITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL 
Apart from the VCCR Optional Protocol, other states have little 
possibility of establishing jurisdiction over the United States to sue in 
the ICJ for a consular access violation. The ICJ potentially has 
jurisdiction over states by declarations they may file, whereby they 
submit to suit by other states for international law violations 
generally.138 The United States filed such a declaration in 1946, but 
retracted it in 1986.139 That left submission to jurisdiction relating to 
particular treaties, such as the VCCR Optional Protocol, as the major 
avenue whereby the United States might sue other states in the ICJ 
and in turn might be sued. Absent the VCCR Optional Protocol, the 
possibility that another state might gain jurisdiction over the United 
States in the ICJ for a consular access violation is remote. 
The absence of other potential routes to jurisdiction puts the 
focus on the validity of the withdrawal. While Department of State 
spokespersons provided an explanation of why the United States was 
withdrawing, they did not address the withdrawal’s validity. They 
 
 136.  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
60-61 (Mar. 31). 
 137.  See supra text accompanying note 134. 
 138.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1063 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 139. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra 
note 11, ch.1, § 4 n.9. 
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obviously viewed the withdrawal as valid.140 However, just as contracts 
in domestic law normally carry an obligation not to rescind 
unilaterally, so treaties in international law normally must be 
honored.141 
A. ICJ Competence to Determine the Validity of a Withdrawal 
In the ICJ context, moreover, when a state that is subject to 
jurisdiction takes action to exempt itself from jurisdiction, the ICJ 
views itself as competent to assess whether the action is valid, or 
whether the state remains subject to jurisdiction.142 Thus, if a state 
party to the Optional Protocol were to sue the United States for a 
consular access violation, relying on the Optional Protocol for 
jurisdiction and asserting that the withdrawal was invalid, that issue 
would be open for the ICJ to decide without deference to the U.S. 
view that the withdrawal was valid. In international practice, 
international tribunals, including the ICJ, decide their own 
competence when a dispute arises over a jurisdictional base asserted 
by the plaintiff state.143 
A similar situation arose in 1984 for the United States, when it 
was sued by Nicaragua on the basis of its 1946 declaration whereby 
the U.S. submitted itself to ICJ jurisdiction for international law 
matters generally.144 Three days before Nicaragua filed its application 
to commence suit, the United States had filed a document with the 
ICJ saying that it would not view itself as subject to ICJ jurisdiction 
for a period of two years on disputes “related to events in Central 
America.”145 
Nicaragua argued that the exemption document did not deprive 
the ICJ of jurisdiction. The United States argued that the document 
was within its prerogatives and that the ICJ had no jurisdiction. The 
 
 140.  In a 2007 press statement, the Department of State characterized the withdrawal as 
having been done as of right: “we exercised our right to withdraw from the Optional Protocol.” 
International Obligations and U.S. Law, STATES NEWS SERVICE, October 16, 2007 (statement 
provided by Department of State), http://www.state.gov. 
 141.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter 
VCLT]. 
 142.  ICJ Statute, supra note 138, art. 36(6). 
 143.  See 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 
1920-1996, 812 (1997). 
 144. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, 395, 398 (Judgment of Nov. 26). 
 145. Id. at 398. See also Ilene R. Cohn, Nicaragua v. United States: Pre-Seisin Reciprocity and 
the Race to The Hague, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 699 (1985). 
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ICJ, agreeing with Nicaragua, decided that it had jurisdiction.146 That 
case, to be sure, involved a unilateral declaration rather than a treaty 
submission, but nonetheless, the ICJ’s attention to the validity of the 
declaration indicates that it does not automatically honor a retraction 
of a state’s prior consent to jurisdiction. 
B. Withdrawal From a Treaty That Lacks a Denunciation Clause 
The validity of a denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty, 
whether the treaty relates to compulsory dispute settlement or to any 
other subject, is not a matter within the sole discretion of the state 
that denounces or withdraws. Rather, one must look at the particular 
treaty to determine if withdrawal is permitted. One possibility is that 
the treaty contains a denunciation clause that would provide for 
freedom to denounce at will. Many treaties include such a clause. A 
primary reason why such a clause would be included is to encourage 
states to ratify, since they know that if the commitment they make 
turns out to be disadvantageous, they are not bound in perpetuity.147 
However, many treaties, including the Optional Protocol, contain 
no denunciation clause. In such a circumstance, the situation is less 
clear as to whether withdrawal is permitted. From the theoretical 
standpoint, the issue poses a dilemma as between two postulates of 
the international order. On the one hand, states are viewed as 
sovereignty entities, entitled to take action according to their 
interests. Haraszti, a Hungarian author writing during the Cold War, 
viewed treaty denunciation in this light, arguing that if a particular 
treaty did not resolve the issue, then “denunciation will have to be 
recognized as following from the principle of international law 
demanding respect for state sovereignty.”148 
On the other hand, international engagements are viewed as 
binding; otherwise states would have little incentive to enter into 
them as a means for ordering relations with other states. States are 
regarded as being required to keep the promises they make via 
treaty.149 If they can ratify one day and denounce the next, the 
obligations assumed may carry little meaning. 
 
 146.  Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 442. 
 147.  See MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 510 (1961) (on treaties providing for 
denunciation). 
 148.  GYÖRGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 
264 (1973). 
 149. VCLT, supra note 141, art. 26. 
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As a technical matter, the argument is that since denunciation 
clauses are well known to treaty drafters, the omission of such a 
clause implies that denunciation is prohibited.150 Denunciation clauses 
are sufficiently common, especially in multilateral treaties, that one 
may reasonably infer that the absence of such a clause reflects an 
intention that denunciation not be permitted. Haraszti, arguing for 
freedom of denunciation, responds to this argument by saying that 
the omission of a denunciation clause may be due to negligence or 
inexperience of a treaty’s drafters.151 
Neither absolutist position—total freedom to denounce or total 
prohibition on denunciation—reflects international practice regarding 
treaties containing no denunciation clause. The most generally 
recognized rule on the matter is found in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a widely ratified agreement that 
regulates major aspects of treaty law. The United States is not a party 
to the VCLT but regards it, at least for most of its provisions, as 
reflecting customary international law on treaty issues.152 VCLT 
Article 56 is titled Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty 
containing no provision regarding termination, denunciation or 
withdrawal. It provides: 
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination 
and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not 
subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: 
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the 
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or 
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by 
the nature of the treaty. 
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months’ notice of its 
intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 
1.153 
Thus, as a matter of procedure in denouncing, VCLT Article 
56(2) requires a time period before a withdrawal would be valid. The 
United States, in its communication to the U.N. Secretary-General, 
 
 150. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 290 (2007). 
 151.  HARASZTI, supra note 148, at 269. 
 152.  65 DEP’T ST. BULL. 684, 685 (1971) (report to Senate by Secretary of State William 
Rogers, stating, “Although not yet in force, the Convention is already generally recognized as 
the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”); Chubb v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 
301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000); see also HARASZTI, supra note 148, at 277 (stating that when 
denunciation is permitted, “a certain period must be allowed to pass between the notification of 
denunciation, and the termination of the treaty”). 
 153.  VCLT, supra note 141, art. 56. 
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gave no time period, apparently purporting to make its withdrawal 
effective immediately.154 
On the basic issue of whether a state may denounce, the validity 
of a withdrawal, according to VCLT Article 56(1), turns on what kind 
of treaty is involved, and whether one can ascertain the parties’ desire 
even though the text of the treaty was silent. Arnold McNair, author 
of a mid-century treatise on the law of treaties, said that where a 
treaty is silent on denunciation, “[i]t is a question of the intention of 
the parties which can be inferred from the terms of the treaty, the 
circumstances in which it was concluded, and the nature of the 
subject-matter.”155 McNair thus put what is encompassed in the two 
sub-paragraphs of Article 56(1) into a single concept, namely, the 
intent of the parties, which could be ascertained through his three-
prong test. As to the subject-matter prong, McNair’s idea is 
apparently that with treaties on certain subjects, one may fairly 
assume that the parties contemplated the possibility of 
denunciation.156 VCLT Article 56(1), on the other hand, separates the 
type of treaty (paragraph 1(b)) from the intent of the parties 
(paragraph 1(a)).  Even if one regards that as a separate basis, it 
probably does, as McNair suggests, relate to what the parties 
anticipated about possible denunciation when they entered into the 
treaty. 
C.Whether the States Party to the VCCR Optional Protocol Viewed 
Denunciation as Possible 
VCLT Article 56 is generally read as creating a presumption 
against a possibility of denunciation in treaties that are silent on the 
subject.157 The most natural reading of Article 56 is that a treaty is not 
subject to denunciation unless one of the two sub-paragraph factors is 
satisfied. If one cannot ascertain from statements made that there was 
an intent to allow denunciation and if the treaty by its “nature” does 
not imply freedom of denunciation, then it is not subject to 
denunciation. 
 
 154.  See also 65 DEP’T ST. BULL. 684, 688 (1971) (Secretary of State Rogers stating that a 
dispute settlement process is required for a withdrawal from a treaty, that a withdrawing state 
must inform all other parties to the treaty and afford them an opportunity to object). 
 155.  MCNAIR, supra note 147, at 511. 
 156.  Id. at 513. 
 157.  Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1594 (2005) (stating that art. 
56 creates “a rebuttable presumption that states may not unilaterally exit from a treaty that 
lacks a denunciation or withdrawal clause”). 
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VCLT Article 56 also seems to require a party seeking to 
withdraw from a treaty silent as to denunciation to carry a burden: 
“Since the grounds for justifying withdrawal are expressed as an 
exception, the onus of establishing that the exception applies lies on 
the party wishing to withdraw.”158 The fact that denunciation clauses 
are written into many treaties is taken to strengthen that 
presumption, since it is well known to treaty drafters that if they want 
to make denunciation a possibility they have the option of including a 
denunciation clause.159 
With the Optional Protocol, there is little in the drafting history 
to show what the parties may have thought about denunciation. No 
denunciation clause was proposed, and no delegate mentioned 
denunciation.160 What we do have, however, is the U.S. statement, 
quoted above, about the importance of compulsory dispute 
settlement.161 The United States, as a proponent of compulsory 
dispute settlement in the VCCR, viewed it as central to the entire 
enterprise of concluding a consular treaty. That view of the centrality 
of compulsory dispute settlement suggests that states, once having 
agreed to compulsory dispute settlement, should not be free to 
repudiate it. 
As seen above, compulsory dispute settlement was put off to a 
separate protocol as the VCCR was being drafted. That change might 
suggest that other states viewed compulsory dispute settlement as less 
central than did the United States. However, the aim behind the 
technique of a separate protocol was to maximize participation in the 
VCCR itself, since it would allow states unwilling to submit to ICJ 
jurisdiction to become parties to the VCCR without having to reserve 
to the submission clause.162 Thus, it may be hazardous to draw 
conclusions about the centrality of compulsory dispute settlement 
from the fact it was put into a separate protocol. 
 
 158. AUST, supra note 150, at 290. 
 159.  Id. (“Since it is now very common to include provisions on withdrawal, when a treaty is 
silent about the matter, it may be that much harder for a party to establish the grounds for the 
exception.”). 
 160. See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 
22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 249-51, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/6, (Mar. 26, 
1963). 
 161.  See supra text accompanying note 126. 
 162. See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 
22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 249-51, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/6, (Mar. 26, 
1963). 
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D.  Whether the VCCR Optional Protocol by Its Nature is 
Susceptible of Denunciation 
Regarding the VCCR Optional Protocol, there is little basis in 
the drafting history to show an expression of intent that denunciation 
should be permitted, which leaves open the question of whether the 
VCCR Optional Protocol is the type of treaty in which a possibility of 
denunciation can be assumed. There has been little state practice on 
the matter, hence it is less than clear what types of treaty imply a 
freedom of denunciation.163 The types of treaties generally thought to 
imply a right of denunciation are treaties premised on a close 
relationship between the contracting states. Treaties of alliance, 
involving perhaps a mutual defense commitment, have been viewed 
in this light, because a state would not want to commit itself to going 
to war absent close affinity. Hence, if the two states, once close, 
drifted apart, then either might denounce. 
Another type of treaty in this category is a treaty of friendship, 
commerce, and navigation, which typically allows nationals of each 
state to engage in business in the other state on a basis of equality 
with locals.164 That agreement is, like a treaty of alliance, premised on 
good relations between the two states, since the nationals of the other 
state gain access to markets and trade in the other.165 A third type is a 
treaty establishing an international organization. There the concept is 
that a state need not continue as a member of an organization that 
may move in directions not to its liking. Even as to these three types 
of treaties, however, state practice is scant.166 
The ICJ addressed the question of the permissibility of 
denunciation of a treaty containing no denunciation clause in a 
dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over a bilateral treaty where 
the two were to build joint water diversion facilities on the Danube 
River. After Hungary denounced, the ICJ found the treaty to be of a 
type that implied that denunciation was not anticipated: 
The 1977 Treaty does not contain any provision regarding its 
termination. Nor is there any indication that the parties intended to 
admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. On the 
contrary, the Treaty establishes a long-standing and durable régime 
 
 163.  See MCNAIR, supra note 147, at 513. 
 164. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 331 (1963). 
 165.  Id. (stating the treaties of alliance and of commerce are “intended to be susceptible of 
denunciation even though they contain no express term to that effect”). 
 166.  Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing No Denunciation 
Clause, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.  83, 96 (1982). 
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of joint investment and joint operation. Consequently, the parties 
not having agreed otherwise, the Treaty could be terminated only 
on the limited grounds enumerated in the Vienna Convention.167 
Although the VCCR Optional Protocol does not contemplate a joint 
financial undertaking, it, like the treaty at issue between Hungary and 
Slovakia, contained no provision regarding its termination. As well, 
with the VCCR Optional Protocol, there is no “indication that the 
parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or 
withdrawal.” 
Treaties on compulsory dispute settlement have been mentioned 
by one author as a potential category where a possibility of 
denunciation may be presumed,168 but state practice provides little 
support for the assertion.169 
Aust, nonetheless, argues that dispute settlement treaties are 
subject to denunciation in absence of a denunciation clause. His 
rationale is as follows: 
This is consistent with the consensual nature of international 
jurisdiction: a state can be made subject to the jurisdiction of an 
international court or tribunal only if it consents, either in advance 
or ad hoc. Moreover, states have withdrawn from such optional 
protocols on dispute settlement to several UN treaties without (at 
least legal) objection, even when they contain no provision for 
this.170 
Aust’s reliance on an absence of objection when dispute 
settlement treaties are denounced is questionable. In theory, other 
states party to the VCCR Optional Protocol might send a diplomatic 
protest note to the United States if they view the withdrawal as 
invalid. Or they might communicate their protest to the U.N. 
Secretary-General as the depositary agency.  In rare instances, states 
have done this when a state party has denounced a treaty lacking a 
denunciation clause.171 However, there is no established procedure for 
reacting to a denunciation by another state party.172 Thus, there is 
little basis for drawing any conclusion from an absence of formal 
objection. The matter would most likely be raised, as suggested 
 
 167.  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 62-63 (Sept. 25). 
 168.  AUST, supra note 150, at 291 (“It will usually be possible to withdraw from a general 
treaty for the settlement of disputes between the parties even when it has no withdrawal 
provision.”). 
 169.  Widdows, supra note 166, at 96-98. 
 170.  AUST, supra note 150, at 291. 
 171.  See, e.g., United Nations, supra note 11, ch. 21, § 1 n.8 (UK objecting that unilateral 
denunciation of Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is not permitted). 
 172.  On that procedure, see VCLT, supra note 141, arts. 19-21. 
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above, if a state party to the Optional Protocol were to file suit 
against the United States in the ICJ for a VCCR violation. 
Aust asserts that there have been withdrawals from optional 
protocols to UN treaties but only cites to the U.S. withdrawal from 
the VCCR Optional Protocol as evidence.173 A search by the present 
author in other treaties of this category revealed no other instances of 
withdrawal. It is believed that there are no other instances Aust could 
cite. 
Aust also mentions the “consensual nature of international 
jurisdiction” as a reason that denunciation should be freely allowed 
from dispute settlement treaties. To be sure, submission to 
international judicial jurisdiction is at the discretion of a state, but 
entry into any treaty is at the discretion of the state. Any obligation a 
state assumes by treaty on any topic is “consensual,” since no state is 
required to enter into any treaty. Hence Aust’s argument, logically, 
would lead to the conclusion that any treaty that lacks a denunciation 
clause may be denounced, a conclusion clearly at odds with VCLT 
Article 56. 
One could perhaps argue that agreeing to compulsory dispute 
resolution implies a close relation with the other states, thus putting 
such treaties into the category of those that may be freely denounced. 
However, many states have agreed, as through the ICJ Statute Article 
36(b) procedure for compulsory dispute resolution or through the 
VCCR Optional Protocol itself to compulsory dispute resolution with 
a wide variety of states not particularly close to them in any sense.174 
E.  Validity of the U.S. Withdrawal from the VCCR Optional 
Protocol 
Since the adoption of the VCLT, there is little state practice on 
denunciation of treaties containing no denunciation clause.175 But in 
the few instances where the issue has arisen, objections have been 
recorded.  In one instance, Senegal purported to withdraw from two 
“law of the sea” treaties, leading the UK to object that withdrawal 
 
 173.  AUST, supra note 150, at 291 n.68. 
 174.  See United Nations, supra note 11, ch. 3, § 10 (listing states with a variety of political 
orientations as ratifies of the VCCR Optional Protocol). 
 175. Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 132, at 913-16. A treaty containing a denunciation 
clause, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has 
been denounced by Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Under that Optional Protocol, 
states party to the ICCPR agree to allowing for complaints to be filed against them by individual 
persons before a monitoring committee. 
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was impermissible.176 Also, North Korea withdrew from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, drawing 
objection from the U.N. Secretary-General177 and from the 
monitoring committee that oversees implementation.178 
With the VCCR Optional Protocol, there is no indication of an 
intent to permit denunciation in the drafting history. It also does not 
readily fall into the category of treaties that can be freely denounced. 
Were another state party to sue, the United States would need to 
sustain a burden on these issues, but judging from what international 
practice has been recorded, the U.S. would face an uphill argument. 
Its position that the VCCR Optional Protocol can be freely 
denounced is difficult to sustain on the basis of VCLT Article 56 and 
international practice. 
IX. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL 
The U.S. withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol, even if 
valid, would not affect cases already filed in the ICJ. Under ICJ 
procedure, future action is possible on cases already filed, even after 
final judgment, since under the ICJ Statute, a state that is party to a 
case may seek clarification of a judgment already issued.179 In 2008, 
Mexico requested interpretation of the Avena judgment before the 
ICJ, after one of its nationals was scheduled for execution without a 
review of his conviction.180 Mexico’s request is not precluded by the 
U.S. withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol.181 
 
 176.  Supra note 172. 
 177.  United Nations, supra note 11, ch. 4, § 4 n.8 (“As the Covenant does not contain a 
withdrawal provision, the Secretariat of the United Nations forwarded on 23 September 1997 an 
aide-mémoire to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea explaining the 
legal position arising from the above notification. As elaborated in this aide-mémoire, the 
Secretary-General is of the opinion that a withdrawal from the Covenant would not appear 
possible unless all States Parties to the Covenant agree with such a withdrawal.”). 
 178.  U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], General Comment No Continuity of 
Obligations, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997) (taking the position that a 
human rights treaty creates rights for a population, and that this may not be revoked). 
 179.  ICJ Statute, supra note 138, art. 60. 
 180.  Application Instituting Proceedings of Mexico, Request for Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals  (Mex. 
v. U.S.) (Mex. v. U.S.), (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14 
582.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008); see also Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Mexico files a 
Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) and asks for the urgent indication 
of provisional measures (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/ 
14578.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (Mexico invoking article 60 of the ICJ Statute). 
 181. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 13 March 2004 in the Case Concerning 
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Additionally, a state in whose favor the ICJ has ruled may 
approach the U.N. Security Council, which is empowered to take 
enforcement measures, if the other state fails to comply with the 
ruling.182 That procedure, similarly, is not precluded by a withdrawal 
for cases already decided. 
The United States, as Secretary Rice explained, continues as a 
party to the VCCR. Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, she said, 
would not impact the commitment of the United States to complying 
with the VCCR and in particular, with Article 36. The Department of 
State has posted advisory messages for law enforcement agencies 
stressing that the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol does not 
diminish their obligation to respect consular access when they arrest 
foreign nationals.183 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has referred to the 
withdrawal as support for a more limited construction of VCCR 
Article 36. In Bustillo v. Virginia, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether it should give weight to the ICJ’s view that 
procedural default rules should not be used to bar consideration of a 
consular access claim.184 Deciding that it need not give any weight to 
the ICJ’s view, the Supreme Court referred to the withdrawal as an 
additional reason for ignoring the ICJ’s view: 
Moreover, shortly after Avena, the United States withdrew from 
the Optional Protocol concerning Vienna Convention disputes. 
Whatever the effect of Avena and LaGrand before this withdrawal, 
it is doubtful that our courts should give decisive weight to the 
interpretation of a tribunal whose jurisdiction in this area is no 
longer recognized by the United States.185 
The withdrawal cannot appropriately be taken to have such an effect. 
The United States is party to the ICJ Statute and was party to the 
consular access cases filed by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico. 
However the Supreme Court resolves the issue of the weight to be 
given to ICJ decisions, it should not accord them less weight because 
of the 2005 withdrawal. Taking that approach will simply make it 
 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Mex. v. U.S.), 2009 I.C.J. _ (Jan. 19), 
http://www.ic j-cij.org (where ICJ declined on other grounds to provide a clarification). 
 182.  U.N. Charter art. 94, para 2. 
 183.  See, e.g., Memorandum from U.S. Department of State, Announcement: All Consular 
Notification Requirements Remain in Effect, available at http://travel.state.gov/new-s/news_ 
2155.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2008). 
 184.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352-53 (2006). 
 185.  Id. at 355. 
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easier for the Supreme Court to persist in espousing the executive 
branch’s idiosyncratic construction of VCCR Article 36. 
A. U.S. Inability to Sue 
The withdrawal limits U.S. access to the ICJ on consular issues. 
One cannot know what events might cause the United States to find it 
advantageous to sue for a consular law violation, but the possibility 
can hardly be precluded. In the 1970s, the United States did not 
expect it would soon be dealing with a hostage-taking at consular 
offices, but when that did occur in Iran in 1979, one of the first 
responses of the United States was to file a complaint in the ICJ, 
using the VCCR Optional Protocol as a jurisdictional ground to 
allege violations of consular law by Iran.186 The United States viewed 
an ICJ decision condemning Iran for the hostage-taking as an 
important element as it sought to mobilize world opinion in its favor. 
Iran at the time, explaining the hostage-taking, highlighted the 
previous history of U.S. actions in Iran, which involved helping 
overturn a democratically elected government in 1953 and bringing in 
a government that came to be viewed as oppressive. Iran asked the 
ICJ not to deal with the U.S. complaint unless it simultaneously 
considered  “more than 25 years of continual interference by the 
United States in the internal affairs of Iran.”187 The occupation of U.S. 
diplomatic and consular offices was accompanied by the opening of 
archives, whose contents were made public to show what the United 
States had done. Iran sought to put those acts in the context of what it 
viewed as the United States’ improper interference.188 The unanimous 
decision the U.S. gained from the ICJ helped marshal sentiment in its 
favor, over and against such assertions by Iran. 
In the present world situation, as in 1979, the United States is 
resented in many quarters,189 and it is not difficult to imagine that the 
United States might experience infringements against its consular 
posts. Consulates have long been a ready target for demonstrations 
by locals seeking to draw attention to policies of a sending state. One 
need only recall actions at Danish diplomatic and consular posts in 
 
 186.  See Application Instituting Proceedings of United States, United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 3, 3-5 (Nov. 29, 1979). 
 187.  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 180 I.C.J. 3, 8-9 
(May 24). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See generally John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the 
Middle East as a Factor Behind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2002). 
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reaction to the publication in Denmark of comic strips relating to the 
Prophet Mohammed. In Beirut, a Danish consulate was set on fire.190 
In 2006, a U.S. foreign service officer working at the U.S. consulate in 
Karachi, Pakistan, was killed in apparent protest of a scheduled visit 
to Pakistan by President George W. Bush.191 Such situations implicate 
the obligations of the receiving state to provide protection. 
The United States may be in a position where it desires to sue for 
a variety of consular law violations, since under the VCCR, consuls 
enjoy a variety of immunities from local jurisdiction.192 As of this 
writing, a dispute remains unresolved between the United States and 
United Kingdom over the imposition of a “congestion charge,” 
requiring payment from drivers who commute by car into central 
London.193 The UK expects consuls to pay. The United States refuses 
to pay, considering the charge as a “tax”—a characterization that 
would provide an exemption for consuls.194 The UK regards the 
charge as a fee comparable to a road toll, which is collectable from 
consuls under an exception clause that specifies that a fee for services 
is not a tax.195 Were the United States to seek to sue the UK in the 
ICJ, it would probably find no jurisdictional base apart from the 
VCCR Optional Protocol. 
B. The Potential of Responsive Action by Other States 
Despite the Department of State’s position that the United 
States will continue to abide by the VCCR, the United States insists 
on constructions of VCCR Article 36 that are viewed by a virtually 
unanimous community of nations as groundless. On the basis of 
international law principles as generally applied, it is difficult to find 
justification for the U.S. positions. As the United States, despite its 
protestations, is viewed by many as being in breach of VCCR Article 
36, foreign states continue to protest when foreign nationals are 
 
 190.  Megan Stack, Beirut Rioters Attack Church, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A1. 
 191.  Kamran Khan and John Lancaster, Pakistan Blast Kills U.S. Diplomat, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 3, 2006, at A10; Declan Walsh, Car bombing: Explosion at US consulate in Karachi kills 
diplomat, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 3, 2006, at 22. 
 192.  LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 339-511. 
 193.  Ben Webster, US diplomats ‘owe £1m in fines’, TIMES (London), Nov. 29, 2006, at 30. 
 194.  See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 49, § 1. 
 195.  See id., art. 49, § 1(e). 
QUIGLEY_FMT2.1..DOC 1/30/2009  9:58:47 AM 
302 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:263 
arrested and convicted of crime, if advice as to consular access is not 
given at the time of arrest.196 
While insisting on rights for U.S. nationals under arrest, U.S. 
consuls have already been confronted with the country’s own spotty 
record of compliance. Such instances have become sufficiently 
numerous that the Department of State has felt it necessary to 
provide instruction to U.S. consuls on how to react. The instruction 
reads that if a receiving state official, upon being asked to facilitate 
consular access, replies that the United States does not respect the 
rights of foreign nationals, a consul should say: 
a. Even where this might be true, it does not exempt the host 
government from its treaty obligations. Two wrongs do not make a 
right. We should all work toward improved compliance with 
consular notification obligations. 
b. Given the multinational and multi-ethnic makeup of the U.S., it 
is difficult to identify a person as a foreign national unless he/she 
claims such nationality or has appropriate documentation. 
c. Unfortunately, the size and composition of U.S. law enforcement 
(local, county, State, Federal) make it difficult to ensure that every 
arresting official understands the obligation to notify foreign 
consuls.197 
Foreign states may, if they choose, take action against the United 
States in response to what they view as U.S. non-compliance with 
VCCR Article 36. Under international law, a state whose rights are 
violated may undertake countermeasures against the other state.198 
Although a state’s countermeasures regarding consular access may be 
limited because such measures may not affect human rights,199 other 
states could take countermeasures affecting, for example, trade 
relations in a way that could harm U.S. financial interests. 
Moreover, other states party to the VCCR may be able to restrict 
the rights of U.S. nationals within the framework of the VCCR itself, 
without resorting to countermeasures as such. The VCCR requires 
states party to treat other states party equally, but with an exception: 
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention the 
receiving State shall not discriminate as between States. 
2. However, discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place: 
 
 196.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International 
Community in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984). 
 197. 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Foreign Affairs Manual § 421.2-3 (2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86605.pdf. 
 198.  G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 82, pt. 3, ch. 2, art. 49. 
 199.  Id. art. 50. 
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(a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of 
the present Convention restrictively because of a restrictive 
application of that provision to its consular posts in the sending 
State[.]200 
VCCR Article 72 thus creates the possibility that other states may 
apply VCCR Article 36 in relation to U.S. nationals in a “restrictive” 
way if the U.S. applies it in a restrictive way to their nationals. As a 
result, a state in which a U.S. national is convicted and sentenced to 
prison without having been advised about consular access might take 
the position that its courts need not entertain a claim for the consular 
access violation, because U.S. courts would not entertain such a claim 
for one of their nationals. 
Hopefully, this route will not be taken since states in general 
prefer to apply treaty provisions relating to individuals in a uniform 
way, regardless of nationality. The German Constitutional Court, for 
example, in a decision rendered eighteen months after the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, indicated that Germany will 
apply VCCR Article 36 in the way the ICJ reads it, namely to provide 
rights for individuals and to afford access to a court for a possible 
remedy in case of violation.201 Germany is likely to afford such rights 
to U.S. nationals, even if the United States does not afford them to 
German nationals. 
The current U.S. course in regard to the VCCR poses potential 
risk to the United States in protecting its own interests and in 
protecting U.S. nationals. The perceived self-interest of the United 
States in protecting itself from suits may turn out to be less significant 
than an interest in protecting both itself and U.S. nationals. 
X. THE ADVISABILITY OF RE-ADHERENCE TO THE 
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 
The Department of State clearly is concerned about whether it 
can adequately represent the interests of U.S. nationals in the face of 
the U.S. performance under, and attitude toward, VCCR Article 36. 
The State Department has made representations on occasion, as 
indicated above, to governors asking for a reprieve on behalf of a 
condemned foreign national, citing concern for its ability to protect 
U.S. nationals.202 To date, however, the United States has not been 
 
 200.  VCCR, supra note 1, art. 72, § 1. 
 201.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sep. 19, 2006, 
2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 2115/01 (¶¶ 65, 68) (F.R.G.). 
 202.  See supra § II. 
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sufficiently concerned to modify its own position, which is at the heart 
of the problem. The executive branch, notwithstanding the ICJ 
decisions in the LaGrand and Avena cases, continues to tell the courts 
that foreign nationals have no rights under VCCR Article 36 and that 
courts do not have to consider remedies when consular access 
obligations are violated.203 Judicial remedies might have a salutary 
impact on compliance by police, which might reduce the number of 
violations. 
U.S. state and federal courts, in the main, are deciding claims by 
foreign nationals of consular access violations in line with the 
Department of State position. In 2006, as mentioned above, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to suppress an incriminating statement made 
by a Mexican national.204 In the same ruling, the Supreme Court 
rejected the consular access claim of a foreign national who raised his 
claim only in post-conviction proceedings.205 Yet, the ICJ specifically 
ruled previously in the LaGrand case that rules on the timing of 
presentation of claims may not be used to bar a consular access claim, 
given that states that have violated an international norm must do 
what they can to provide redress.206 
The U.S. Supreme Court and Department of State’s construction 
of VCCR Article 36 carries the risk that the United States will not 
only be viewed as being incorrect on a legal matter, but also as 
disingenuous and as using its power position to disregard the law. The 
U.S. views have been rejected by two international courts and by the 
other states party to the VCCR; nonetheless, the Department is not 
altering its course. In 2008, in an amicus curiae brief for the United 
States, the Department of State again told a U.S. court that the 
preamble language of the VCCR negates an individual right, and the 
court relied on that opinion as it denied a claim.207 
 
 203.  Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Medellin v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) (“Permitting private judicial enforcement in the 
absence of action from the President or the Congress would deprive the political branches of the 
very choice of means that the ICJ intended for them to have. Thus, while petitioner is entitled to 
review and reconsideration by virtue of the President's determination, such review and 
reconsideration would not be available to petitioner in the absence of the President's 
determination.”). 
 204.  See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 205.  See id. 
 206.  See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98 (June 27). 
 207.  See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that the preamble 
language reflected the fact that VCCR governs inter-state relations only). 
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The United States should revise its severely battered 
construction of VCCR Article 36, both because it would thereby 
conform to the construction used by other states party and because its 
own constructions are difficult to square with legal principle. A 
modification of the U.S. positions along these lines would not only 
bring the United States into compliance with the obligations it has 
undertaken towards foreign states and their nationals but would also 
greatly assist U.S. consuls in protecting U.S. nationals abroad. 
Ultimately, the United States could enhance respect for the VCCR, 
and for itself, by retracting its withdrawal from the VCCR Optional 
Protocol. 
 
 
